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INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 2006, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
promulgated regulations implementing a new Disability Service Im-
provement (DSI) process for making disability decisions in the Disa-
bility Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs.1 In
general, the DSI process adopts the approach SSA outlined in pro-
posed rules eight months earlier,2 with some important improvements
over the originally proposed process. The key elements of the new
process are the introduction of Quick Disability Determinations
(QDDs) for certain types of claims where an initial finding of disability
can be made within twenty days; the creation of a Medical and Voca-
tional Expert System (MVES), designed to improve the quality and
availability of medical and vocational expertise throughout the admin-
istrative process; the elimination of the reconsideration level of review
following an initial denial of disability benefits; the addition of a Fed-
eral Reviewing Official (FRO), who will review appealed initial deci-
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
tt Fellow in Law and Government, Washington College of Law, American University;
former Research Director of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
1982-1995.
ttt Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University.
I Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 & 422). DSI is
part of a broader SSA initiative to improve the disability determination process that in-
cludes introducing an electronic disability file system (eDib), improving quality control,
enhancing management information, updating medical and vocational policy, and imple-
menting various work opportunity initiatives. See id. at 16,424-27.
2 Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 70 Fed.
Reg. 43,590 (proposedJuly 27, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 & 422).
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sions before such decisions are scheduled for an administrative
hearing; the modification of rules on submitting evidence at adminis-
trative hearings; and the replacement of the final-appeal-level Appeals
Council with a new Decision Review Board (DRB) charged with
broader responsibility for identifying and correcting systemic decision
errors.3 Although questions remain about certain details of the new
procedure, SSA and Commissioner Jo Anne Barnhart have under-
taken a much-needed, comprehensive reform of the SSA disability ad-
judication process.
4
The need to reform the disability determination process has been
clear for many years. It is difficult enough to decide whether any indi-
vidual is, as set forth in the Social Security Act disability standard, una-
ble to engage in "substantial gainful activity" in light of not only his or
her physical and mental impairments, but also any effects of his or her
age, level of education, and work experience. 5 Making disability de-
terminations fairly and accurately for millions of claims-and in hun-
dreds of thousands of appeals-is a daunting task. Moreover, stresses
on the existing system have increased over the last two decades, as the
background section of the new rules indicates. 6 During this period,
the number of beneficiaries receiving disability benefits has doubled,
while the number receiving need-based Supplemental Security In-
come has increased 130%, 7 putting pressure on the entire adjudica-
tion system. The 500,000 hearings that SSA Administrative Law
Judges (ALJs) processed in fiscal year 20058 are daunting by any
measure.
The key procedural problems that the new rules seek to address
are the amount of time taken to reach final disability decisions and a
lack of confidence in the accuracy and consistency of the decisions
themselves.9 In a report prepared for the Social Security Advisory
Board (SSAB) in 2003,10 we pointed out a problem that lies at the root
3 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,427-28, 16,433.
4 Efforts to introduce fundamental changes to SSA's disability determination process
have proven difficult, as evidenced by the long record of failed reform proposals over the
past twenty-five years. For a discussion of some of these past efforts, see Frank S. Bloch,
Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonad-
versary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 4-16 (2003).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d) (1)-(2) (A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(D) (2000).
6 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,424 ("The number of disability beneficiaries in our programs has grown signifi-




10 FRANK BLOCH, JEFFREY LUBBERS & PAUL VERKUIL, INTRODUCING NONADVERSARIAL
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES TO IMPROVE THE RECORD FOR DECISION IN SOCIAL SECURITY
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of these concerns: Throughout the process, decision makers, includ-
ing ALJs following a full administrative hearing, often make disability
determinations based on incomplete evidentiary records.'I Any effort
to reform the disability determination process must target the prompt
development of a full and complete record. Unless that critical part
of the process is fixed, decision makers-no matter what they are
called or under what new set of rules they operate-will be unable to
do their jobs properly.
Our SSAB study was commissioned to examine the possibility of
introducing government representation at Social Security hearings
and to address the question of when and how to close the administra-
tive record.12 During the course of the study, we interviewed the full
range of interested parties, including front-line SSA and state Disabil-
ity Determination Service (DDS) personnel, ALJs, and claimant advo-
cates.' 3 To frame the issues, we asked supporters of government
representation to explain what they thought a government representa-
tive, or someone in a similar role, would add to the process from a
functional perspective.' 4 Virtually all of them highlighted the need
for better development of the evidentiary record.1 5 Moreover, differ-
ing views about closing the record among the people we interviewed
depended to a large extent on the person's confidence about the re-
cord development process: The more confident someone was about
the quality of the record at the time of decision, the more likely he or
she was to support closing the record at, or even before, the hearing. 16
In reality, there are two distinct aspects of the incomplete record
problem. The first pertains to the length of the current process and
the nature of the claimant population. Medical conditions may
change during the many years it often takes claimants to wend their
way through the various stages of the current process (initial decision,
reconsiderations, ALJ hearing, and Appeals Council review). There-
fore, even evidentiary records that are accurate at the outset may look
different at later stages of the process. The second aspect results from
DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS (2003), available at http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-Lub-
bers-Verkuil.pdf; see also Bloch, Lubbers & Verkuil, supra note 4, at I n.* (reporting on the
study).
II See BLOCH, LUBBERS & VERKUIL, supra note 10, at 66.
12 See id. at 1.
13 See id. app. I, at 79.
14 See id. at 67.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 67-68. Thus, "[t]hose who were the most confident about the record
development process were more likely to suggest a 'bright line' cut-off." Id. at 68. On the
other hand, "those more concerned about the quality of the record were more likely to
suggest some sort of safety valve, such as a 'good cause' requirement for submitting addi-
tional evidence along the lines of the requirement for submitting additional evidence at
the district court." Id.
2007] 237
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
deficiencies in the design and implementation of the process itself.
Staff charged with processing disability claims-particularly at the
state DDS, but also at the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA)-
are neither properly trained nor given sufficient resources to compile
the detailed medical information necessary to determine disability
under SSA rules and regulations. 17 We concluded that while the disa-
bility adjudication process needed active monitoring, government rep-
resentation was not the answer. 18 Thus, we suggested appointing
nonadversarial "Counselors," whose main responsibility would be to





Many aspects of the new SSA rules will help improve the quality
of evidentiary records used to decide disability claims. Thus, we agree
with the Commissioner's plan to eliminate the reconsideration level
of review. Simply shortening the process will reduce the "moving tar-
get" problem of claimants' changing medical conditions. More funda-
mentally, bypassing this intermediate step will help to focus resources
and energy for disability determination at the two critical decision
points in the process: the initial administrative decision and the ALJ
hearing. The current model dissipates limited resources and energy
for disability determination by spreading the process over four admin-
istrative levels, particularly so with the essentially repetitive initial deci-
sion and reconsideration levels.
The addition of QDDs at the initial decision level for selected
types of claims-those where the information needed to decide disa-
bility can be obtained quickly and easily-is also a positive and practi-
cal approach to case management. Setting apart claims for which the
evidentiary record may be compiled with little difficulty will allow SSA
to direct much-needed resources to more difficult claims. The effort
to improve the quality and uniformity of medical-expert input
through an MVES is another welcome innovation. The details of this
reform will not be developed until SSA receives the results of a study it
commissioned from the Institute of Medicine (IOM).20 However, de-
cision makers will likely use these experts to help obtain the medical
and vocational information needed to reach a decision according to
17 See id. at 15-16.
18 See id. at 71.
19 See id. at 72.
20 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424, 16,431-32 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 &
422).
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the relevant regulations. 21 An interim report by IOM suggests that
SSA adopt internal procedures and orient training along these lines.
22
The replacement of the Appeals Council with the DRB is more
complicated, as it removes the possibility of administrative review of
many ALJ decisions. This change may result in unnecessary appeals to
federal district court, or more distressingly, may lead to many ALJ de-
cisions not being reviewed at all where the claimant lacks the means to
proceed to court. As with the elimination of reconsideration, how-
ever, the change does have the advantage of focusing the disability
determination process on initial decisions and ALJ hearings and of
advancing the administrative side of the process. The change also in-
troduces a potentially effective mechanism for quality control. We
recognize that some commentators, notably the Judicial Conference,
have expressed concern about the potentially "significant caseload
ramifications for the federal courts" of removing the Appeals Council
and the opportunity (and requirement) for claimants to appeal ALJ
decisions administratively before going to court.23 For that reason,
SSA's plan to phase out the Appeals Council slowly while assessing the
implementation of the rest of the reform seems wise. 24 We also ap-
prove of the final rules' addition of provisions allowing claimants to
file a two-thousand-word statement with the DRB, 25 removing the pro-
vision concerning DRB consultation with the MVES in individual
21 See id. at 16,431.
22 COMM. ON IMPROVING THE DISABILITY DECISION PROCESS: SSA's LISTING OF IMPAIR-
MENTS AND AGENCY ACCESS TO MED. EXPERTISE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., IMPROV-
ING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY DECISION PROCESS: INTERIM REPORT 5-11 (2006).
23 See Commissioner of Social Security's Proposed Improvements to the Disability Determination
Process: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Social Secur-
ity of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Hon. Howard D.
McKibben, Chair, Judicial Conf. Comm.), available at 2005 WL 2376204 (Westlaw).
24 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,441. The SSA rule does not detail the DRB's structure and internal procedures.
The comment of the American Bar Association's Section of Administrative Law and Regu-
latory Practice, however, suggested that perhaps the Board's structures and procedures
could be modeled on that of the Bankruptcy Court Appellate Panels. See Letter from Elea-
nor D. Kinney, Chair, Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, to Jo
Anne Barnhart, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.abanet.org/jd/
ncalj/pdf/ekinneyssa.pdf. Two of us also promoted this approach in a report to the
SSAB. See Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of
Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 747-48 (2003). That report also rec-
ommended renewed consideration of an Article I Social Security Court to deal with Article
III court caseload concerns. See id. at 778-82. Others have argued against such a court.
See, e.g., Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals,
15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1987).
25 See 20 C.F.R. § 405.425(b) (2006).
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cases, 26 preventing the review from being based on the identity of the
ALJ, 2 7 and adding a ninety-day time limit on the review process. 28
II
SOME REMAINING CONCERNS
Two aspects of the proposed rules were especially problematic:
the role set out for the FRO and a set of new deadlines for submitting
evidence and closing the record at ALJ hearings. This Part discusses
the final rules' improvements on these aspects of the process, as well
as some remaining concerns.
A. The Role of the Federal Reviewing Official
Our study for the SSAB concluded that something more than a
mere second try by a different DDS team-SSA's practice at the recon-
sideration level of appeal-was needed between the initial decision by
the DDS and the ALJ hearing.29 Thus, we suggested a full review of
the file by a nonadversarial Counselor who could assess the initial de-
cision and the evidentiary record on which it was based and prepare
the claim for the next step in the process: a full-fledged administrative
hearing and decision by an independent ALJ.30 The Counselor's re-
sponsibilities would include evaluating the initial decision and the
medical evidence in the record, obtaining additional evidence if
needed, and, where appropriate, proposing to the ALJ that the claim
be granted on the record without a hearing.
Instead, the new rules create the position of FRO, to be filled by
lawyers with the authority to make a new decision on the claim. In
effect, the FRO will act much like a preliminary judge; however, the
new rules give claimants and their representatives no more access to
the FRO than they now have to the DDS reconsideration team. More-
over, it appears that FRO decisions will have all the trappings of a
formal decision including being written by a lawyer, presumably in a
lawyerly style. Even though ALJs are not formally bound by the FRO
decision, they might be more inclined to defer to these lawyer-written
decisions than they were to a second administrative decision after re-
consideration review.
We believe that the interests of both claimants and SSA would be
better served by charging the new FRO primarily with assuring the
development of a timely, full, and fair record, much like the
26 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,439.
27 See id.
28 See 20 C.F.R. § 405.420(a)(2) (2006).
29 See generally BLOCH, LUBBERS & VERKUIL, supra note 10.
30 See id. at 75.
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nonadversarial Counselor proposed in our SSAB report.3 1 Other tasks
envisioned for the FRO under the new rules would be fully appropri-
ate for the FRO under this model as well. Indeed, most of the all-
important record development work on a Social Security disability
claim-obtaining existing medical and vocational records, measuring
existing information against alleged impairments and applicable eligi-
bility criteria, and ordering additional medical and vocational evalua-
tions-are essentially neutral tasks best performed outside an
adjudicative setting. A Counselor-like FRO would stand in an ideal
position to frame the issues on appeal, seek out specific additional
medical or vocational information necessary to evaluate the claim
under applicable rules and regulations, and grant claims on the re-
cord. All the while, the process could remain focused on the two pri-
mary decision points in the adjudication process: the initial decision
and the ALJ hearing.
In addition to our SSAB report, a number of proposals have been
advanced over the years to address the problem of record develop-
ment in the disability determination process. Some have focused on
existing administrative practices and procedures, while others have
suggested deployment of personnel with an eye to improving SSA's
performance in developing the record for decision. One proposal in
particular, SSA's Senior Attorney Project, introduced a position within
the OIA that was charged with a role similar to the one outlined
above for the new FRO. Sixteen years ago, the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States (ACUS) recommended greater use of pre-
hearing conferences to frame the issues involved in the ALJ hearing,
identify matters in dispute, determine the necessity of subpoenas, con-
sider whether witnesses might be called, and decide appropriate cases
favorably without hearings.3 2 The FRO could orchestrate all of these
functions in advance of the ALJ hearing with the cooperation of the
DDS and, where appropriate, the ALJ. We incorporated many of
these ideas into the nonadversarial "Counselor" position that we sug-
gested in the following recommendation in our SSAB report:
SSA should consider creating a new administrative position, called a
"Counselor," with the express mandate of overseeing and facilitat-
ing the development of the evidentiary record for decision. As part
of this process, the Counselor position should have the following
characteristics and responsibilities:
31 See id.
32 See Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommen-
dation (Recommendation 90-4), 55 Fed. Reg. 34,213, 34,215 (Aug. 22, 1990); Frank S.
Bloch, Report for Recommendation 90-4: Report and Recommendations on the Social Security Admin-
istration's Administrative Appeals Process, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 307, 385 (1990).
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* It should be charged with developing a full and complete record
as quickly as possible, in cooperation with claimants (and their
representatives), DDS, OHA, and other SSA personnel.
* It should have direct access to key DDS personnel in order to
question and clarify the DDS's rationale for its disability
decisions.
* It should have independent authority to obtain information for
the record, including access to any available funds and enforce-
ment mechanisms.
* It should have a formal role, either independently or in coopera-
tion with ALJs and other OHA staff, to narrow and resolve partic-
ular issues and, when appropriate, to recommend to an ALJ a
fully favorable, on-the-record decision.
* It should be designated nonadversarial, even if attorneys fill
some of the positions.
3 3
The key to our recommendation was that SSA should concentrate
its efforts on improving the record for decision at ALJ hearings.3 4 We
believed that the best way to achieve this goal would be to introduce a
nonadversarial Counselor into the disability adjudication process.
The Counselor's central roles would be to monitor the process of de-
veloping the evidentiary record and to work closely with all the key
actors-the claimant (and the claimant's representative, if applica-
ble), the ALJ, and SSA (most likely through DDS)-to identify any
gaps in the record and to fill them as quickly and efficiently as possi-
ble. 35 These Counselors would remove much of the development
work from the ALJs, including the second- and third-hat roles of assur-
ing that the claimant's and SSA's (or DDS's) positions remain fully
supported, and would serve as much-needed administrative liaisons
between the DDS and OHA.3 6 We also recommended that the Coun-
selors be given the resources and authority necessary to develop
records and process claims quickly, especially in those cases where
benefits could be granted without full administrative hearings.
37
In its final rule, SSA did not adjust the role of the FRO to be
more of a counselor than a decision maker, but it did make some
significant improvements. Most importantly, it provided two mecha-
nisms that will aid in the record development for cases that proceed to
the ALJ stage. First, the final rule provides that in making a decision,
the FRO may consult evidence submitted by the claimant, even if not
submitted with a request for review.38 Second, the final rule autho-
33 BLOCH, LUBBERS & VERKUIL, supra note 10, at 76-77 (Recommendation 3).




38 See 20 C.F.R. § 405.215(b) (2006).
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rizes the FRO to issue subpoenas to obtain additional evidence when
necessary.3 9 SSA enacted these changes to reinforce a record-develop-
ment role for the FRO.40 Moreover, although the rule provides that
the FRO could still issue "decisions" subject to an appeal before an
ALJ, SSA did not grant the FROs the proposed power to dismiss or
remand cases to the state agency.4' The final rule also clarifies that
FRO decisions are not to be considered evidence in an ALJ proceed-
ing; however, the requirement that ALJs must furnish a rationale for
agreeing or disagreeing with the FRO decision remains in place.
42
These changes go a long way toward enabling the FRO to develop
a full and complete record in preparation for the ALJ stage of the
case, while allowing the FRO to grant benefits in clear-cut cases. The
concern remains, however, that authorizing the FRO to issue a deci-
sion to deny benefits will excessively formalize this stage of the pro-
cess, canceling out the streamlining provided by eliminating the
reconsideration stage.
B. Rules for Submitting Evidence at the ALJ Hearing and
Closing the Record
The concept of "closing" an administrative record arises in two
very different contexts: preparing a record for decision and preserv-
ing the record of a decision for further administrative or judicial re-
view.43 The process of preparing a record for decision typically
continues until the decision is reached; the record is closed when (or
just before) the decision is made.44 This is the procedure during the
initial-decision and reconsideration stages in the current process and
will continue at the initial-decision and FRO stages under the new
rules.45 The DDS is charged with developing the record such that a
competent initial-disability decision can be made. Once the eviden-
tiary record is complete, the DDS makes its decision based on the re-
cord. Presumably, the FRO would proceed in a similar fashion,
39 See id. § 405.217(a).
40 Thus, in explaining its response to public comments calling for a greater record-
development role, SSA stated in the preface to the new rules: "We are committed to giving
the [FRO] both the responsibility and the resources to assure [sic] that a claimant's [evi-
dentiary] record is adequately developed." Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating
Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,424, 16,433 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20
C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 & 422).
41 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 70 Fed.
Reg. 43,590, 43,595 (proposed July 27, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416
& 422).
42 Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,453.





supplementing the record as necessary before making a final evalua-
tion of the evidence and rendering a decision. Closing the record
would thus not become an issue until the ALJ hearing.
46
ALJs and OHA staff currently develop the record as necessary to
prepare the case for hearing and decision. In addition, the claimant-
appellant may submit supplemental evidence both before and during
the hearing. Although claimants are expected to identify additional
evidence to be submitted at the time they request a hearing,47 regula-
tions also expressly provide that any party may submit evidence at the
hearing as well.48 This is necessarily so, as the administrative hearing
is a de novo review of the claim 49 and the only point in the administra-
tive decision and appeals process where witnesses may testify before a
decision maker. 50 Moreover, the Social Security Act guarantees as
much: "[T] he Commissioner shall give -[claimants] . .. reasonable no-
tice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to [an adverse] deci-
sion, and, if a hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the
hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's findings of fact
and such decision."51 In addition, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to
verify that the record contains all the information necessary to decide
the case.52 Thus, Social Security regulations provide that "[a]t the
hearing, the administrative law judge looks fully into the issues, ques-
tions [the claimant] and the other witnesses, and accepts as evidence
any documents that are material to the issues.1
53
Under current practice, it is also possible for the record to stay
open or be reopened after the hearing. If the claimant requests addi-
tional time to obtain evidence, the ALJ may hold the record open for
46 See id.
47 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.933(a) (3) (2006).
48 See id. § 404.950(c); see also id. § 404.950(a) ("Any party to a hearing has a right to
appear before the administrative law judge, either in person [or by means of a designated
representative,] to present evidence and to state his or her position.").
49 See BLOCH, LUBBERS & VERKUIL, supra note 10, at 41.
50 There is one limited exception under current procedures for reconsideration that
remains despite the elimination of reconsideration for new claims: A hearing officer con-
ducts a "disability hearing" in cases in which a recipient appeals from a decision to termi-
nate benefits on the ground that he or she is no longer disabled. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 405(b) (2) (West Supp. 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.914, 416.1414 (2006). Of course, there is
also no live testimony during judicial review.
51 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.953(a),
416.1453(a) (2006) (directing ALJs specifically to decide the claim "based on evidence
offered at the hearing or otherwise included in the record").
52 See, e.g., Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Even when a
claimant is represented by counsel, an 'ALJ has a basic obligation in every social security
case to ensure that an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consis-
tent with the issues raised.'" (quoting Henrie v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13
F.3d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993))).
53 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (2006).
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a set number of days after the conclusion of the hearing. 54 The ALJ
may also decide to continue the hearing at a later date pending re-
ceipt of additional evidence, or may reopen the hearing if additional
evidence becomes available before the decision is issued.
55
In a significant shift from past practice, the proposed rules for
submitting evidence and closing the record at the ALJ hearing would
have required parties to submit evidence at least twenty days before
the hearing, with limited exceptions at the discretion of the ALJ.
56
This strict limit, operating together with a rule that required hearings
to be scheduled with forty-five days' notice, 57 would have left only
twenty-five days after notice of the hearing date to submit evidence.
In addition, the ALJ would have had the discretion to allow the parties
to submit evidence after the hearing. Parties would have been re-
quired to submit evidence that could be obtained only after the hear-
ing, such as proof of an unforeseen change in medical condition,
within ten days of the decision. 58 An additional rule would have im-
posed on claimants a strict ten-day limit for objecting to the time and
place of the hearing and the issues to be decided on appeal. 59
The time limits of the proposed rules were widely criticized as
creating a potential trap for claimants, especially those without repre-
sentation. 60 Moreover, they would have contradicted their intended
purpose-to provide the ALJ with the record needed to make a
prompt and accurate decision-and would have cut short the all-im-
54 See BLOCH, LUBBERS & VERKUIL, supra note 10, at 41.
55 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (2006) ("The administrative law judge may stop
the hearing temporarily and continue it at a later date if he or she believes that there is
material evidence missing at the hearing. The administrative law judge may also reopen
the hearing at any time before he or she mails a notice of the decision in order to receive
new and material evidence."); see also OFFICE OF DISABILrrY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, SoC.
SEC. ADMIN., HALLEX: HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL § 1-2-6-80 (2005),
http://ssa.gov/OP-Home/hallex/ ("Circumstances may require an ALJ to adjourn a hear-
ing in progress and continue it at a later date, conduct a supplemental hearing, or reopen
the record to receive additional evidence.").
56 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424, 16,428 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 & 422).
57 See id.
58 See id. at 16,437.
59 See id. at 16,436.
60 This was a common theme among many of the witnesses who testified about the
proposed rules at ajoint hearing of the Subcommittee on Social Security and the Subcom-
mittee on Human Resources of the House Committee on Ways and Means on September
27, 2005. See, e.g., Commissioner of Social Security's Proposed Improvements to the Disability Deter-
mination Process: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and the Subcomm. on
Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Frank S.
Bloch, Ph.D., Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law), available at 2005 WL
2376210 (Westlaw); id. (statement of Marty Ford, Co-chair, Social Security Task Force,
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities), available at 2005 WL 2376205 (Wesdaw); id.
(statement of Thomas D. Sutton, President, National Organization of Social Security
Claimants' Representatives), available at 2005 WL 2376209 (Westlaw).
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portant record development function. 61 With respect to closing the
record, the goal should be to reform record development to the point
where closing the record becomes an uncontroversial matter.
Thankfully, SSA took heed of this criticism and markedly im-
proved the final rules on closing the record. SSA changed the time
limit on notice of the hearing date from the proposed forty-five days
to seventy-five days, and changed the requirement that claimants file
their evidence with the ALJ at least twenty days before the hearing to
at least five business days (with a good cause exception for filing even
later). 62 By extending the advance-notice period for the hearing and
shortening the deadline for submitting evidence, the time between
notice and the filing deadline has been increased to approximately
seventy days from the proposed twenty-five days. Similarly, the final
rules extend the time limit for objecting to the time and place of the
hearing from ten days after receipt of notice to thirty days and allow
claimants to object to the issues contained in the hearing notice
within five business days of the hearing.63 Thus, the new rules retain
the policy of closing the record after the ALJ stage while allowing the
ALJ sufficient discretion-with somewhat more liberal guidelines than
the proposed rules-to hold the record open at the time of the hear-
ing or to reopen it after the hearing.64 This approach is consistent
with the idea that the new process leading up to the ALJ's decision will
have already produced, to the extent that can be reasonably expected,
a full and complete record.
CONCLUSION
SSA should be applauded for its responsiveness to the comments
and concerns expressed by the affected community during the
rulemaking process.65 SSA's actions have resulted in a reasonable set
of new rules on submitting evidence at the ALJ level. Over the years,
some commentators have suggested that Social Security appeals
61 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,424 ("The purpose of the rule is to improve the accuracy, consistency, and fair-
ness of our disability determination process and to make the right decision as early in the
process as possible.").
62 See id. at 16,428.
63 See id. at 16,434.
64 ACUS presented similar ideas in a 1990 supplementary recommendation, which
addressed the need to have the evidentiary record be as complete as possible and as early
in the process as possible. ACUS proposed that the record before the ALJ should be
closed at a set time after the hearing and then set forth a specific recommendation similar
to SSA's final rule. See Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary
Recommendation (Recommendation 90-4), 55 Fed. Reg. 34,213, 34,215 (Aug. 22, 1990).
65 SSA received nearly nine hundred written comments during the ninety-day com-
ment period on the proposed rules. See Administrative Review Process of Adjudicating
Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. at 16,427 ("The comments we received were detailed
and insightful, and they have been extremely helpful to our deliberations.").
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should shift to an adversarial process.66 The new rules reject that
idea, however, stating that the administrative review process is to be
conducted "in a non-adversarial manner. ' 67 A successful nonadver-
sarial process is very difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, if the shared
goal of making "the right decision as early in the process as possible"
68
is taken to heart across the board-by the claimants' representatives,
in making every effort to comply with the deadlines, and by the ALJs,
in responsibly exercising their discretion to waive requirements-it
stands a much better chance of being achieved. Similarly, these new
rules could lead to a more effective and productive administrative
hearing process if the parties involved (the claimants and their advo-
cates, the ALJs and their staff, and the FROs in their role as reviewers
of not only decisions but also the completeness of the evidentiary re-
cord) act in a truly nonadversarial manner.
69
66 See Social Security Administration's Management of the Office of Hearings and Appeals:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong.
(2003) (testimony of Hon. Ronald G. Bernoski, President, Association of Administrative
Law Judges) ("Such representatives would be responsible to defend the position of the
agency at the hearing, recommend favorable cases, exercise settlement authority, and assist
unrepresented claimants."), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=
view&id=766.
67 The new rules state for the first time in regulations that the process is nonadver-
sarial. See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,447 ("In making a determination or decision on your claim, we conduct the
administrative review process in a non-adversarial manner."). Previously, the nonadver-
sarial nature of the administrative review process was mentioned only in the context of the
rules of conduct and standards of responsibility for claimant representatives. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1740(a) (2), 416.1540(a) (2) (2006).
68 This oft-repeated mantra was expressed in the first paragraph of the introduction
to the new rules. See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability
Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. at 16,424.
69 See BLoc-i, LUBBERS & VERKUIL, supra note 10, at 72.
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